G.K. AND A.S. v. SWITZERLAND

Both cases apply the same general exhaustion principle under Article 35 § 1, and G.K.'s conduct — complaining to the prison administration, appealing to the Court of Justice, and then to the Federal Supreme Court invoking Articles 9 and 13 — mirrors the requirement that complaints be raised 'in substance' before the appropriate domestic body using available procedural means.

In Z.A. and K.S. the Court explicitly relied on prior findings under Article 3 to decline a separate Article 13 ruling; the G.K. excerpt contains no equivalent recorded merits finding under Article 9 (the substantive right at issue here), so the precondition for declining a separate Article 13 ruling is not shown to be met.

Al Nashiri concerned Article 35 § 2 (b) and the prior existence of a parallel international investigation procedure (the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention); nothing in G.K.'s facts involves any such parallel international procedure, so this admissibility issue does not arise here.

Ottlakán's Article 13 complaint concerned inability to access compensation already awarded for inhuman detention conditions under Article 3; G.K.'s Article 13 complaint instead concerns the lack of a challengeable domestic 'decision' about his vegan diet, tied to Article 9, with no compensation or Article 3 conditions-of-detention issue present.

The application of Rule 2 states that 'the excerpt provided stops before any such substantive examination (of Article 9 or otherwise) is recorded — it breaks off at 'As to the...' immediately after the Federal Supreme Court's domestic-law reasoning.' This implies that the full context of the G.K. case might contain the substantive examination needed to apply Rule 2, but the analysis is limited by the provided excerpt. While the analysis correctly notes the limitation of the provided text, it's important to acknowledge that the 'excerpt provided' is the constraint, not necessarily a flaw in the original case's reasoning.

The analysis correctly identifies that the provided text for G.K. does not contain a substantive examination under Article 9. However, it does not explicitly state that the absence of this examination is the *reason* why a definitive conclusion cannot be reached regarding Article 13 in conjunction with Article 9. While implied, making this explicit would strengthen the argument.

The analysis states that the rule cannot be applied to a conclusion on these facts alone. While true, it could be strengthened by explicitly stating what *additional information* would be needed from the G.K. case to make a definitive ruling on the violation of Articles 13 or 13+9. For example, the Court's actual findings on the merits of the Article 9 complaint.